

[This paper will be revised and updated and is forthcoming in: R. Celikates, S. Haslanger & J. Stanley (eds.): *Analyzing Ideology*, Oxford UP 2024; a previous German version appeared as “Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit, Looping-Effekte und Ideologiekritik: Eine sozialphilosophische Perspektive”, in: *WestEnd. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 14 (2017), 2, 53-72]

Robin Celikates
(FU Berlin)

Beyond the Critical Theorists’ Nightmare: Epistemic Injustice, Looping Effects, and Ideology Critique¹

1. Althusser’s “Concrete Example” – and Three Challenges for Ideology Critique

Let me start with an example, or more precisely: with what Louis Althusser, in his influential text on *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, calls a “concrete example”:

“The proletarian, when his [sic] workday is over (the moment he has been waiting for since morning), drops everything, without further ado, when the whistle blows, and heads for the lavatories and lockers. He washes up, changes his clothes, combs his hair, and becomes another man: the one who is going to join the wife and children at home. Once he gets home, he is in a completely different world that has nothing to do with the hell of the factory and its production rhythms. At the same time, however, he finds himself caught up in another ritual, the ritual of the practices and acts (free and voluntary, of course) of *familial* ideology: his relations with his wife, the kids [la femme, les gosses], neighbours, parents, friends [...]. Caught up in these other ‘systems’, [...] how could he be expected not to become someone other than the man he is at the factory – for example, someone altogether different from the union militant or CGT member he is? [...] Might that mean that this proletarian, ‘conscious and organized’ when he attends union meetings with his fellow workers, is caught up in another, petty-bourgeois ideological system once he gets back home? Why not? Such things happen. And that would explain a great deal.” (Althusser 1969: 205-6)

¹ I have presented previous versions of this paper at Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main, the University of Stuttgart, Trier University, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, the Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, the University of Essex, the New School for Social Research in New York, MIT, Eastern China Normal University in Shanghai and Humboldt University Berlin – I would like to thank all participants, and especially Sally Haslanger, Alice Crary, Rahel Jaeggi, Fabian Freyenhagen, Karen Ng, Tim Henning, Philip Hogh, Lu Kaihua, Tong Shijun, Chris Volk and Ulf Bohmann for their helpful questions and suggestions.

This little story that Althusser presents exemplifies various aspects of the classical notion of ideology as it has been developed in the Marxist tradition.² If one seeks to explain why even workers who developed some degree of critical consciousness fail to become revolutionary agents and in the end contribute to the relatively smooth reproduction of the status quo with their ways of acting, one has to turn to the role of ideology, i.e. forms of false consciousness that are anchored in practices and self-understandings and stabilize them in turn. Ideologies ensure that agents “find themselves caught up” in ways of acting that make it seem they lack any critical consciousness at all – “the vast majority of (good) subjects work all right ‘all by themselves’” (ibid.: 269). In order to understand what is going on here, one has to focus on the mechanisms that make agents participate – in a way that is not coerced but “free and voluntary” – in practices that integrate them into the existing order and neutralize the bit of critical consciousness they may have managed to attain. Althusser’s friend – according to the author “a comrade who is a lathe operator in a Citroen factory” – obviously fails to understand these connections. In contrast, the right kind of social theory – the “true knowledge [...] of Marxist-Leninist science” (ibid.: 180, n.12) –, it seems, would allow us to answer the questions that provide the starting point for this in some ways classical version of the theory of ideology (although it is often pointed out how radically Althusser breaks with classical Marxism, in this respect the continuities seem more pertinent): Why do so many people accept social and political conditions that are – more or less clearly – against their “objective” interests? How is it possible that subjects regard their actions as “free and voluntary, of course”, when these very actions subject them to social relations of domination that in turn shape their ways of acting?

In what follows my interest is not in discussing this classical conception of ideology in its own right. Rather, I will first identify three challenges any critical theory of society has to face if it seeks to retain the concept of ideology in its theoretical repertoire (and as I hope to show in the course of this paper, there are good reasons for doing so). In a second step I will discuss several prominent suggestions about how to think about ideology and related phenomena that have been developed in recent debates in philosophy of language and epistemology (especially in the work of Miranda Fricker, Sally Haslanger and Jason Stanley) and that provide elements of answers to these challenges. Although these approaches indeed do contain important insights for the project of a critical social theory, I will argue that they also exhibit common shortcomings that make it necessary to complement them with a more substantial social-theoretical (or sociological) perspective that furnishes us with the theoretical means to adequately theorize the structural dimension of ideology, especially as it negatively affects the capacities of ‘ordinary’ agents to engage in practices of critique. In the third and final section I will outline, in relatively programmatic ways, the theoretical framework within

² Just to avoid misunderstandings: Althusser himself does not intend this as an example of a sexist ideology or a naturalized division of gender roles.

which a reconstructed concept of ideology could do some useful work. This will involve moving beyond Althusser's nightmarish scenario in which 'ordinary' agents are locked into ideological domination, requiring the critical theorist to occupy an external position from which she speaks, certainly not with, but in the best case to those agents.

To begin with, let me briefly sketch the three challenges that in my view make it necessary to break with the classical notion of ideology that we prominently find at work in Althusser's story quoted above.

The first of these challenges can be called the *normative or criterial* challenge. On the one hand, some adopt a critical or pejorative notion of ideology and argue that ideologies as such are problematic and that they should be criticized *qua* ideology (see, e.g., Geuss 1981, Jaeggi 2008, Leopold 2013). They have to answer the question what makes ideologies problematic and whether there is a single feature or set of (systematically related) features that makes them problematic. On the other hand, others adopt a so-called neutral or descriptive conception of ideology and argue that only certain ideologies are problematic, or that ideologies only become problematic under certain circumstances (see, e.g., Geertz 1964, Ricœur 1984, Haslanger 2014b). They have to answer the question what the criteria are to distinguish these problematic ideologies from 'non-problematic' ones and whether there is a single feature or set of features that makes ideologies problematic (without making critical social theory dependent on normative standards derived from ideal-theoretical approaches in political or moral philosophy).

The second challenge can be called the *methodological or epistemological* challenge. In the end Althusser's position – as well as that of many other proponents of the classical approach – amounts to claiming that "ordinary" agents are under the spell of ideology, that they are deluded "judgmental dopes" (Garfinkel 1967: 75; Hall 1986: 33). If 'ordinary' agents are seen as being under the spell of ideology in this way, however, this gives rise to the question from which standpoint the critic of ideology speaks. On the other hand, if, like some adherents of classical Marxism and of standpoint epistemology, one argues that the standpoint of ideology critique is, or should be, that of 'ordinary' (oppressed) agents the question is precisely which (actually held or ascribed) insights of which agents – given that they usually do not constitute a homogeneous category – the critical theorist articulates and whether, and if so, how, she can gain some critical distance with regards to the agents in question.

The third challenge can be called the *explanatory* challenge. If ideology is understood in terms of "totality" – as in Althusser's and many other critical approaches –, i.e. as a mechanism that operates on the relatively abstract level of "the system" or society as a whole, one has to answer the question through precisely which mechanisms the existing order is reproduced, i.e. how exactly it happens that

the worker is “caught up in another, petty-bourgeois ideological system”.³ In reaction to this challenge, especially in the more recent discussion, some authors (e.g. Haslanger 2012, Stanley 2015) have conceptualized ideology in terms of sets of mechanisms. This, however, raises the further question of what exactly holds the rather broad conglomeration of partly psychological, partly social mechanisms – from implicit biases via stereotypes to looping effects – together and makes them into elements of *one* ideology.⁴

These challenges have plagued the debate about ideology within the tradition of critical theory from its very beginning, but how they are to be addressed remains an open question until today. In order to find elements for an answer, the next section turns to how they have been addressed – explicitly or implicitly – in recent debates.

2. Epistemic Injustice, Looping Effects & Propaganda – Probing the ‘Depth’ of Ideology

What exactly is problematic about the situation in which Althusser’s proletarian comrade finds himself? One possible answer makes reference to his epistemic situation. Since he seems unable to recognize and understand that his “normal” and “expected” behavior is contributing to the relatively smooth reproduction of precisely those social conditions that he should regard as problematic – and indeed does regard as problematic when he hangs out with other union members in the factory – his status as an epistemic subject seems to be damaged or undermined. On this interpretation, ideology is problematic because it damages and undermines this status. But how can this epistemic harm be characterized more precisely?

In her much-discussed book of the same title Miranda Fricker introduces the notion of *epistemic injustice* in order to conceptualize situations in which actors are undermined in their status as epistemic subjects. She focuses on two types of cases.

The first type of case Fricker (2007: ch. 1) calls “testimonial injustice”: In these cases, negative stereotypes have a negative impact on the status of the stereotyped individuals as epistemic subject. Examples include situations in which members of socially salient groups suffer from credibility deficits due to socially mediated and shared stereotypes as they fail to be recognized as full participants in epistemic, and more specifically: testimonial practices. To take just two examples, it is well-documented that the police (in an institutional failing that is not simply reducible to the misbehavior of some individual officers) takes testimony from witnesses classified as having (what in Europe is called) a migrant “background” less seriously than testimony from witnesses who are not so classified ... or

³ This challenge is prominently raised by Jon Elster (1985: ch. 8) in his call for identifiable micro-foundations for macro-level phenomena such as ideology but it can take other forms and does not depend on the methodological individualism adopted by Elster.

⁴ See Jost/Federico/Napier 2013 for a unified theoretical framework in political psychology that brings different mechanisms together.

think of class-room situations in which patterns of epistemic exclusion and marginalization asymmetrically affect students with certain backgrounds or ascribed identities in their capacity to contribute to and participate in discussions even in the absence of individual bias (see Haslanger 2014a).

The second type of case Fricker (2007: ch. 7) calls “hermeneutical injustice”. In such cases, given the hermeneutical resources at their disposal, members of socially salient groups can articulate significant aspects of their social experience only in inadequate and distorted ways or not at all. As Fricker explains, this is “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalization” (Fricker 2007: 154). With reference to the example of sexual harassment at the workplace, Fricker (2007: 149-152) convincingly shows how this leads to harmful intelligibility deficits. *Before* the concept of sexual harassment was introduced and gained currency in the 1970s, women subjected to sexual harassment – which obviously preexisted the conceptual innovation – were confronted with an *additional* epistemic obstacle that made it difficult if not impossible for them to articulate their lived experience as one of (socially recognized) injustice (one other factor being that every attempt at articulating this experience was, and continues to be, at risk of being dismissed by different forms of victim blaming).⁵

Testimonial as well as hermeneutical injustices can be understood as important subcategories of ideology. Insofar as they are not incidental but systemic, or structural, both are related to the (often unintended or even unconscious) effects of social oppression and the mechanisms of its reproduction that are not reducible to “epistemic bad luck” (Fricker 2007: 152-3). It is not simply bad luck that the hermeneutical resources of society exhibit these gaps in precisely these places (such bad luck may exist and it may even be collectively shared while still affecting individuals to massively different degrees, as in the case of an undiagnosed medical condition and its effects). Rather, these are cases of *systematic* epistemic injustice since what Fricker calls “hermeneutical marginalization” usually corresponds to social marginalization in other contexts (e.g. at the workplace, but also in politics, law, and the media). Epistemic injustice thus supervenes on asymmetric social power relations, and co-constitutes as well as supports these relations at the same time (by way of a looping effect, on which more below).

Although Fricker’s analysis is very enlightening, there are reasons to doubt that the identification of these two important forms of epistemic injustice exhausts the specificity and complexity of the phenomenon of ideology. My claim is not that it is the aim of Fricker’s account to develop a theory of ideology and that she fails to do so (it is not, and hence she doesn’t); rather I claim that given the aims of her account and the phenomena she is interested in, there are strong reasons to go further in exploring the connections between the two forms of epistemic injustice she analyses and other

⁵ On the related phenomenon of silencing and the ways in which it accommodates injustice see Langton 2017.

forms of ideology (see also Mills 2017). Against this background, ideology appears to point beyond epistemic injustice in three respects.

First, ideologies often reach “deeper” than hermeneutical injustices that, in turn, reach “deeper” than testimonial injustices. Ideologies can not only have the effect of making it difficult or impossible for subjects to adequately articulate experiences they themselves are able to individuate as such (think of the experience of unjust treatment in cases where the victims are aware of the treatment and its unjustness but fail to adequately articulate it, e.g. due to lack of adequate hermeneutical resources). They can also have the effect of making these experiences diffuse or intransparent for the subjects in question or of blocking them from making these specific experiences in the first place. Here one can think of Adorno’s writings in which critique, while having some experiential anchoring point, cannot point to explicitly or transparently available experiences – as the human capacity to make certain kinds of ethically salient experiences atrophies under certain social conditions –, but rather has to start from symptoms or very diffuse feelings or affects.⁶ Underpaid adjuncts in neoliberal universities, women in classically patriarchal family arrangements and business lawyers in the City may not even experience their situation as one of exploitation or oppression or alienation – or as problematic in some other way, yet it is at least an open question, for the critical theorist, what to make of this ... Obviously Fricker does not have to deny that they, too, could indeed be victims of unjust social relations, but her account does not seem to allow her to interpret these situations as cases of epistemic *injustice*, or as standing in some continuity with the cases she discusses, since such injustice only obtains when hermeneutic marginalization frustrates the *attempt* of a concrete individual to articulate her experience – the experience she has already made – in a way that is socially legible and consequential. However, ideologies that go beyond this relatively narrow understanding of epistemic injustice can also be understood as curtailing or undermining the epistemic status or the epistemic and experiential capacities of the subjects in question – again, in an Adornian vein, think of how the socially normalized indifference towards socially produced suffering can lead to the atrophy of moral and experiential capacities even on the side of those who are at the top of the hierarchy in corporations (see Dejours 1998). Maybe these could be labelled cases of experiential or phenomenological injustice.

Second, and relatedly, ideologies are characterized by a high degree of epistemic resilience. Resilience refers to the degree to which a system can absorb irritation without having to change – a system is thus more or less resilient to the extent that it can remain in its current state in the face of resistance (in the case of belief systems, e.g., in the face of countervailing evidence). Ideologies, as a specific form of epistemic oppression, again, reach “deeper” than epistemic injustice in Fricker’s sense (see Dotson 2014). Testimonial injustices, which are due to an inefficient use of epistemic resources (witnesses who

⁶ For a discussion, see Freyenhagen 2013. Other examples for such an experience-based approach can be found in the feminist literature, see, e.g., Scheman 1980.

are present and reliable but whose testimony is discounted), and hermeneutical injustices, which are due to deficient hermeneutical resources (the experience is present to the subject but she lacks the necessary vocabulary to adequately articulate it), are, in most cases, relatively easy to identify and correct for – they can be exposed from within, as it were, since in the case of testimonial injustice reliable witnesses are present and “simply” have to be heard and taken seriously, and in the case of hermeneutical injustice the experiences have been made and “simply” have to be matched with the right kind of vocabulary to express them (obviously, how “simple” this turns out to be in practice can vary to a great degree depending on the specificities of the context). In contrast, the ideological character of certain beliefs, commitments and identities – including their epistemic inadequacy – is comparatively difficult to adequately identify, reflect on, problematize and address due to the resilient character of ideologies. This resilience is primarily due to how ideologies are bound up with – embedded in as well as reproduced by – practices, habits and identities. Not only are the available epistemic resources limited or inadequate in the case of ideology, but this limitation or inadequacy is shielded from being adequately identified, reflected upon, problematized and addressed due to its systemic features. Furthermore, the inadequacy, or even lack, of these epistemic resources is reproduced and cemented by a whole range of political and social practices and institutions, such as the education system and mass culture – in ways, moreover, that can have reinforcing and immunizing effects on the forms of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice Fricker focuses on.⁷

Third, and finally: In suggesting that the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutical justice are adequate reactions to the two types of injustice she identifies, Fricker runs the risk of underestimating the structural character of ideology which is not situated on the same level as the ethical or unethical attitudes and behaviors of individual agents. Fricker (2007: 118) seems aware of this problem when she characterizes the virtue of hermeneutical justice as “essentially corrective” – it allows its bearers to locally alleviate the effects of a structure that is itself left in place. Dislodging that structure would require sustained efforts of collective action about which Fricker has little to say ... She does, however, say this (Fricker 2007: 174): “Shifting the unequal relations of power that create the conditions of hermeneutical injustice (namely, hermeneutical marginalization) takes more than virtuous individual conduct of any kind; it takes group political action for social change.” What is true of some forms of hermeneutical injustice certainly holds for ideologies: The background structures that are causally responsible for them are not (primarily) reproduced via the intentions of individual agents and therefore do not depend on individual attitudes that could be corrected by making individuals more virtuous. Given the structural character of ideology, as Adorno (1963: 98) says with Paul Valéry, the

⁷ In a further twist the corresponding discourses can even seek to appropriate and thereby neutralize the counter-hegemonic resources oppressed groups may manage to build up – think of how critical discourses on racism were taken up in the discourse of ‘reverse racism’, how ‘Black Lives Matter’ became ‘All Lives Matter’ etc.

concept of virtue seems to have grown old and appears as “archaic” and “obsolete” (see also Menke 2005).

These skeptical remarks give rise to the question of how to understand the structures that stand behind ideologies, their “depth” as well as their reproduction. How do these macro-structures work, and also: what are the micro- and meso-mechanisms that help to sustain and stabilize them?

One prominent proposal for how to answer this question can be found in Sally Haslanger’s recent work. According to her we can understand structures as emerging out of looping effects. Haslanger (e.g. 2014b: 389-390) speaks of looping effects since ideological schemata – intersubjectively shared patterns of perception, thinking and acting – manifest social meanings in material forms that can reach from insurance systems to the layout of public space. These material manifestations Haslanger also calls resources, since agents can use them as points of orientation and support in their actions: Ideological schemata thus manifest themselves in resources that are structured in a specific way, while these resources in turn confirm ideological schemata and in this way stabilize and reproduce them – a loop in the course of which structures emerge. Take a simple example: The fact that many people perceive and navigate the world in ways that are mediated by binary gender schemas manifests itself in the layout of social space (including built social space), which in turn actualizes and confirms the corresponding schemas (only think of toilets in most public buildings and the irritations caused by recent discussions about gender-neutral toilets). Hegemony not only colonizes consciousness but also the world, and consciousness via the world (Haslanger 2014b: 391).

But does the analysis of structures in terms of looping effects really exhaust the structural dimension of ideology? One problem one might see with this explanation of the reproduction of structures is that – despite the convincing emphasis on the importance of structural explanation – structures and especially the rigidity of structures cannot be reduced to looping effects. How do looping effects situated on the micro- and macro-level scale-up to macro-structures such as capitalism or patriarchy? Can looping effects by themselves really explain the resilience of structures, the rigid patterns of social stratification and the path dependencies that emerge from them when this very process involves the selective stabilization of loops? How do looping effects on the micro- and meso-level add up to macro-structures such as capitalist or patriarchal societies? Why do certain loops ‘stick’ (Leopold 2013: 25) and, while others fizzle out and evaporate? How is it that certain structures are so good at attracting and enlisting looping effects, thereby congealing into structures, while others seem to evaporate over time or collapse when challenged?

Haslanger herself identifies a related problem, when she writes (Haslanger 2012: 467): “This loopiness can obscure the social dimension of social structures. When ideology is uncontested and hegemonic, it is insufficiently conscious to be aware of its own effects. So the causal impact of hegemonic schemas on resources is typically invisible. Because the ‘trigger’ for a schema is external—in the world—we

attend to this, and social structures come to seem inevitable, natural, ‘given’: Although all ongoing social organizations incorporate contest and struggle over the constitution of their world, most aspects of social structure are taken for granted [...]. Social actors accept a good part of their social worlds as necessary, and often as natural, as perhaps they must do to function at all in those worlds.” But what if loopiness does not only obscure the social dimension of social structures for the agents who enact it – what if it also obscures more fundamental structural mechanisms that develop a logic of their own, a certain path-dependency, and an ability to shape and enlist loops in non-contingent ways that seem to operate top-down rather than bottom-up? These questions point to the need to develop a theoretical vocabulary beyond looping effects in order to fully account for the emergence and reproduction of structures.

This leads me to another worry: Haslanger’s theory of ideology seems to suffer from functional underdetermination as it remains somewhat unclear why certain schemata are ideological and why certain ideologies are problematic, or more problematic than others. Their problematic character seems due to the external, to some extent independently identifiable effects they have or come to have and that the critic evaluates as negative, e.g. in terms of constituting and maintaining unjust social structures, i.e. social structures whose unjust character has already been independently established by reference to a moral or evaluative vocabulary developed by ideal theorizing in moral and political philosophy.⁸ However, with regard to most paradigm cases of ideology (the ones Marxist, feminist and critical race theories have focused on), it seems misleading to say that they remain unproblematic (albeit a case of ideology) until they at some point start having problematic effects. Rather, the forms of naturalization and decontestation that ideologies typically involve are problematic from the get-go as they block agents from adequately understanding their situation and from transforming it in accordance with their own reflectively endorsed interests, self-understandings and identities. Note that this is a friendly or immanent critique of Haslanger’s approach, as, I would argue, what it sets out to explain, e.g. with regard to gender- and race-based oppression, namely the persistence of structures of oppression and domination and our own involvement in their enactment and reproduction, can only be explained if one complements or enriches her approach with some of the (more social-theoretical or sociological) theoretical tools developed in the tradition of critical theory.

Another interesting proposal on how to understand the mechanisms that contribute to the reproduction of the social status quo has recently been developed in Jason Stanley’s attempt to explain the effectiveness of propaganda with reference to ideological beliefs. Stanley (2015: 57) is especially interested in what he calls “undermining propaganda”. This concept is supposed to pick out a mechanism that can explain the persistence of socio-political phenomena that, at first sight, seem to

⁸ As Haslanger (2014b: 386) writes: “We cannot live together without ideologies to guide us. Although some ideologies are pernicious and partly constitute unjust social structures, improved ideologies are crucial in order to achieve social justice.”

stand in contradiction to the official self-understanding of liberal democracies and their express value commitments (Stanley's primary example is the racist prison system of the US). This form of propaganda essentially consists in appealing to shared norms and ideals (say freedom, or security) with reference to a goal the pursuit of which undermines these very norms and ideals (surveillance or the prison system) – a connection that the addressees of propaganda seem to have a hard time recognizing as such, especially since it is their ideological beliefs that enable or at least strengthen the effectiveness of propaganda.

Similar to Haslanger's earlier writings on the topic in this respect, Stanley starts out by using a neutral conception of ideology according to which ideologies are essentially sets of schemas, biases and stereotypes that structure the expectations of agents and allow them to navigate social reality. As he says, they provide "our path through the social world" and "a social script that governs one's expectations" (Stanley 2015: 184, 200). In the next step, however, this forces Stanley to introduce a distinction between (unproblematic) "ideological beliefs" on the one hand and (problematic) "flawed ideological beliefs" on the other which is supposed to explain when exactly the indispensable orienting function of ideology turns into something that should be criticized and overcome. Stanley understands the beliefs in question as flawed in an epistemic (and not in a moral or political) sense: They block our gaining knowledge of the (social) world (here Stanley refers to Fricker's work on epistemic injustice) and are resistant against rational revision in a way that is self-reinforcing, since they are deeply rooted in social practices and identities. Their unrevisability is, as it were, entrenched. Furthermore, due to their palliative effects the price even privileged agents would have to pay in giving them up is considerable. As it turns out, on this account it is primarily the ideology of the elites that is entrenched and stands in need of analysis and critique.

Although Stanley's approach contains powerful insights into the concrete functioning of ideologies, and can serve as an example of a critique of society that operates with relatively minimal normative commitments, I want to suggest that it stands in need of more complex social-theoretical elaboration in at least three respects: First, since propaganda seems essentially tied to the existence of (manipulative) intentions it is unclear whether it really provides a good paradigm case for how ideologies work. Ideologies seem to operate by way of structural mechanisms that are relatively independent from the conscious intentions even of the agents that might profit from them, and their workings are difficult to explain exclusively in terms of individual psychology – including the individual (non-conscious) attachment to identity (this focus, in a way, represents a step back from Marx's understanding of ideology to that of Rousseau). Second, tying ideologies to schemata and identities that fulfill an indispensable orienting function risks losing sight of the functional specificity of ideology, namely its role in the reproduction of existing relations of domination. Similarly, pointing to the resistance of ideological beliefs to revision and updating in the face of counterevidence identifies one

important aspect of ideologies (which, as also Haslanger insists, are not to be reduced to systems of belief) but it risks losing the specificity of the phenomenon from view – its function for the reproduction of the status quo. Finally, Stanley’s somewhat one-sided analysis of this functionality in terms of the self-legitimation of elites and the control of ideological state apparatuses (such as the education system and the media), while certainly relevant for the purposes of political analysis, risks losing sight of the more complex theoretical models and functional analysis developed in social theory and philosophy that also allow us to take into account the effects propaganda and ideology have on those who have an interest in social transformation but are blocked from developing adequate forms of consciousness and practice (see, e.g., Adorno 1951). Again, one could argue that these problems are due to the lack of a broader social-theoretical framework that would allow Stanley to place the no doubt relevant mechanisms of propaganda in the context of how structures of domination get reproduced.

3. Ideology Critique as Second-Order Critique

In the remainder of this paper I will now sketch how the project of a theory and critique of ideology could be reformulated in ways that take up insights from this discussion but avoid its shortcomings that are mainly due to an absent or one-sided understanding of (the role of) structures and the lack of a more social-theoretical framework (this latter point I can only flag but not develop in this paper). To begin with, it seems useful to recap the three dimensions often associated with the classical (critical) concept of ideology (see Geuss 1981, Shelby 2003, Jaeggi/Celikates 2017: ch. 8).

In the first, epistemic dimension ideologies always encompass epistemically deficient beliefs and attitudes. These do not have to be substantially false beliefs; examples of the kinds of epistemic deficiency that are characteristic for ideologies also include mistakes about the epistemic status of one’s beliefs, naturalizing interpretations of socially constituted phenomena (e.g. of looping effects, think of Marx’s critique of the categories of political economy; see also Jaeggi 2008), the confusion of particular and universal interests, one-sided reductions of complexity and inadequate concepts (such as “predator” in the discussion about drug criminality (see Stanley 2015: 159-161) or “chastity” when discussing a woman’s behavior (Haslanger’s example)).

In the second, functional dimension ideologies are seen as playing a necessary, or at least supporting, role for the stabilization and legitimation of social relations of domination, i.e. for their more or less smooth reproduction (a point emphasized in Althusser’s discussion of reproduction). If epistemically deficient beliefs are not linked to the reproduction of relations of domination in this way, there is no reason to call them ideological (calling them ideological makes no clear theoretical contribution to understanding them). It therefore makes a difference whether more than half of the population believes in ghosts or in the existence of the “American Dream” – both is the case and both is

probably problematic, but only in the second case is there a sufficiently clear connection with the reproduction of relations of domination to speak of ideology. For the same reason, it makes a difference whether we are talking about biases and heuristics and their irreplaceable orienting function in general, and ideological forms of orienting oneself in social space.

According to the third, genetic dimension ideologies have a “tainted origin”, as Geuss (1981: 21) puts it. They come into existence against the background of social relations of domination and could only have been acquired under these specific social conditions (only in a deeply patriarchal or sexist society will people develop the idea that women are intrinsically less suited for academic careers than men). It is not an accident that people end up with the specific set of beliefs they end up with in our type of society ... at least this is the hypothesis put forth by the critical theorist. This, in turn, refers us back to the epistemic dimension as the genesis of ideology is intransparent or opaque for its subjects, as well as to the functional dimension as it is no accident that people come to hold these specific sets of beliefs rather than others.

One problem with the approaches discussed above seems to be that they drop one or more of these three dimensions of the critical notion of ideology. Haslanger (at least in her earlier writings on the topic; for her revised account see Haslanger 2017) and Stanley tend to use the concept in a neutral way, thereby uncoupling it from its functional relation to the reproduction of social power relations. But this relation is what motivated the introduction of the concept in the project of critical theory in the first place. The challenge was – and continues to be – to understand how social power relations get reproduced even in the absence of outright repression in ways that actively involve and enlist those who are oppressed (see Leopold 2013: 34-5; Finlayson 2015; Haslanger 2014b).

Furthermore, this uncoupling of ideology from its function forces the theorist to reintroduce some kind of link in a second step, with the risk that this happens in a relatively ad hoc way and without sufficient social-theoretical backing, in order to be able to distinguish problematic from unproblematic ideologies. Otherwise it would become difficult to mark the difference between “mere” prejudice and racism and to avoid trivializing claims such as “All humans have racist attitudes”⁹. Without embedding the use of the notion of ideology in a broader social-theoretical framework, theories of ideology run the risk of losing sight of the original point of the critique of ideology – a point that is tied to the explanatory role the concept of ideology is supposed to play in analyzing the persistence of unjust, oppressive and exploitative social structures (see also Jaeggi 2008).

As I indicated above, however, we cannot simply continue to subscribe to the classical understanding of ideology and its three dimensions (the epistemic, the functional and the genetic), as it ignores or

⁹ As Spike Lee (quoted in Blum 2002: 40) has memorably pointed out, this difference matters: “Now black people can be prejudiced. Shit, everybody’s prejudiced about something. I don’t think there will ever be an end to prejudice. But racism, that’s a different thing entirely.”

fails to answer convincingly the challenges I identified at the outset. Without being able to return to these challenges in detail, I would like to briefly sketch the theoretical framework within which I think answers to these challenges could be developed or within which these challenges might at least become somewhat less pressing. Three corrections or additions seem especially called for in relation to the classical conception of ideology.

First, it seems theoretically as well as politically relevant that ideology (just as alienation and reification) is a second-order phenomenon: the *modus operandi* of ideologies is different from substantial injustices and other problematic first-order phenomena. Accordingly, the critique of ideology has to proceed in a way that is different from, say, the critique of substantial injustices (with the examples of epistemic injustice discussed above providing interesting limit cases). If we are faced with oppressive – e.g. unjust or exploitative – social relations, these do not necessarily constitute cases of ideology; it only makes sense to speak of a case of ideology if social relations of this type are not experienced as oppressive, unjust or exploitative, or if they are intuitively experienced, but not explicitly recognized as such, or if they are recognized but not adequately interpreted and articulated as such, and consequently accepted as either legitimate or natural. This can happen, e.g., due to processes of cultural exclusion that lead to “desymbolization” and “individualization”, where desymbolization refers to mechanisms that weaken the ability to articulate which is the basis of the successful thematization of social injustice, and individualization refers to mechanisms that counteract the “risk” of communicative agreement about group- and class-specific experiences of injustice by either directly requiring or structurally privileging individualistic action orientations and self-understandings (see Honneth 1982).

Against this background we can think of the effects of ideologies primarily in terms of blocking the development and/or exercise of the reflexive and critical capacities of the agents in question (see Celikates 2009 and 2012). This is intended to be a rather minimalist or formalist understanding of ideology critique (see also Ng 2015) and it might be seen to raise the following question: how does this formality of the basis of ideology critique relate to the substance of most empirical instances of ideology critique? After all, critics of ideology (including Frankfurt School critical theorists, feminists and critical race theorists) seem to rarely limit themselves to formal conceptions of self-reflexive subjectivity but engage in much more substantial forms of critique ... So is the reference to social obstacles that block the development and/or exercise of reflexive/critical capacities of ‘ordinary agents’ really sufficient, or are much more substantial normative, socio-ontological, anthropological or historical assumptions unavoidable and does the critical theorist thus have to take on the task of spelling them out rather than sidestepping them by appeal to supposedly merely formal reference points? As I hope will become clearer in a moment, the formality of the proposed account is supposed to strengthen rather than weaken its critical force, especially by curtailing critical theorists’

tendency to put themselves into a position where they speak for rather than with those who are oppressed and engaged in everyday struggles against oppression. Its primary focus should therefore be on the second-order obstacles that block first-order reflection and debate (see also Jaeggi/Celikates 2017: ch. 8).

The second-order dimension is especially salient in the case of ideologies, which are often marked by the kind of meta-blindness or meta-insensitivity that José Medina (2013) characterizes in terms of the epistemic challenges they pose: Ideologies make it difficult, if not impossible, for agents to recognize their own epistemic limitations and to assess their effects, thereby strengthening the epistemic resilience of their ideological beliefs. Against this background, and following the methodological maxim that critique should track the structure of its object, ideology critique can be understood as second-order critique: If ideologies hide the possibility of criticizing (and transforming) these very ideologies and the problematic first-order phenomena they mask, then the first aim of the critique of ideology has to be to identify these blockades of critique and to work towards their dissolution. In this respect, ideology critique can be seen as taking a procedural turn: Its task is not so much to replace a mistaken or distorted view of social reality with one that is correct (as Althusser implies), or to develop a substantial vision of how society should be organized (as mainstream political philosophy does); rather, its task is to make it possible for agents to ask these questions and collectively look for answers to them themselves.

In response to the objection that such a form of metacritique is insufficient to establish an alternative or a direction for social transformation, I think ideology critique should plead guilty – and point out that there are good methodological and political reasons for this modesty. Moral and political evaluation and the development of substantial alternatives are indeed important tasks – maybe even important philosophical tasks – but they should be distinguished from ideology critique, and it is problematic if those engaged in ideology critique – beyond providing a critical analysis that identifies obstacles to the development and exercise of critical capacities and practices – slide into a discourse that ends up telling people how to live. Critical theory should therefore avoid what Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 144) calls the stance of “legislative reason” and its “pretence [...] to the unique understanding that allows it and it alone to tell the goers how and where to go, and what for”. This does obviously not mean that ideology critique is normatively or politically neutral – quite the opposite, it takes social struggles and critical forms of consciousness that oppose oppression as its starting point, even if these struggles and forms of consciousness can themselves turn out to be limited and distorted in ways that critical theories are designed to analyze and criticize (so there can also be asymmetries on this picture, but they are less problematic as they are both temporary and partial). And it does not mean that ideology critique lacks any substance, as it has to provide a substantial social-theoretical analysis of the obstacles in question – but its normative commitments are minimal and not derived

in a way that is free-standing or independent from actually existing emancipatory struggles. Otherwise the main methodological difference between critical theory and the mainstream of normative ideal theorizing in political philosophy would disappear.

In a somewhat schematic way this procedural¹⁰ turn of the critique of ideology can be illustrated with reference to the critique of “false” needs: While Herbert Marcuse’s aim, e.g. in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), was to formulate a substantial critique of the false needs that capitalism has induced – a critique that is formulated on the basis of anthropological assumptions about the realization of human nature and “authentic” human needs –, Nancy Fraser (1987), to my mind rightly, insists on the fact that needs are always the objects of needs interpretations and ascriptions and that the critique of “false” needs thus should not be understood as the substantial critique of the “false” content of needs. Why would critical theorists be able to claim some special insight into the “true” needs of human beings, needs that they themselves might not even be aware of? Rather, the critique of needs should focus on the conditions under which needs are interpreted and ascribed – e.g. on whether this happens in more or less exclusive, hierarchical and distorting ways (see Celikates 2017). The critique of ideology, then, would primarily consist in criticizing those blockades and distortions that keep agents from interpreting and articulating their needs in ways that are reflexively acceptable to them.

The second addition follows from this first one. Like the procedural turn, it is motivated by an attempt to reduce the risk of authoritarian and paternalistic epistemologies that are often implied in how the notion of ideology gets employed in critical discourses and that plague some classical theories of ideology (leading them to conceptualize so-called ordinary agents as “judgmental dopes” and the critic as occupying an external standpoint). A less functionalist and totality-oriented and more open conception of the blockades and distortions that are at the core of ideology is better able to account for the diverging experiences, oppositional forms of consciousness and actually existing practices of critique and resistance of those affected (including Althusser’s proletariat), and makes these available as starting points for critique.¹¹

Now of course one might ask: is the assumption that there are such experiences, forms of consciousness and practices not naïve? Do we not have to account for situations in which the dominated simply accept the existing order, in which ideological domination is so successful that there is no reference point for critical theory in the context it seeks to address? I have two responses to this worry. The first simply wonders how empirically likely such a scenario is. Are there convincing historical examples for such epistemically closed situations of oppression? There are at least reasons for doubt: As James Scott has argued in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, whether one finds forms

¹⁰ “Procedural” may not be good label for this position, as its Habermasian associations are somewhat misleading.

¹¹ A similar point is made by Hall (1986) who argues that instead of the distinction between true and false consciousness we should rather use other terms such as partiality, inadequacy and one-sidedness to capture what is wrong with ideology.

of critical consciousness and of resistance in a society also depends on where one looks. Critique and resistance often operate in ways that are not necessarily visible to the dominant or to later historians or theorists. They do not always find their ways into the official archives, accounts and news stories. Hence Scott (1990) looks for what he calls “infrapolitics” and “hidden transcripts”, forms of political consciousness and action that are archived in songs, tales, jokes etc. Another example can be taken from the history of slavery which clearly shows that the ‘happy slave’ is a myth. There are plenty of examples of how slaves managed to conform to imposed role expectations when interacting with their white masters and how differently they spoke and acted in the subaltern public spaces in which they were amongst themselves. It is equally well documented how varied the more or less clandestine forms of resistance were they managed to engage in often on a daily basis (see, e.g., Bauer & Bauer 1942; see also Collins 1989).

On a more theoretical level, the second response could refer to Jacques Rancière’s critique of the Platonist imaginary that informs critical theories that aim at liberating those whom they locate in the cave of ideologically sealed ignorance (Rancière 1983; see Celikates 2014). In this way, they do not only ignore the often highly reflexive and critical forms of consciousness and practice the dominated have developed but contribute, on a symbolic level, to the domination they pretend to respond to, by speaking for rather than listening to those who are oppressed, and by abstracting from the actual struggles, interests, discourses of the oppressed and replacing them with a more idealized construct that fits the views of the theorist. In a similar vein, Charles Mills (1990: 37, 42) has argued that the “phenomenology of vanguardism” and its corresponding form of consciousness, by turning away from those seen as being stuck in the cave and awaiting cognitive liberation, tend to immunize themselves against empirical refutation and are thereby led deeper and deeper into “a cave of their own”. My point here is that this risk can be accommodated within a reconstructed and self-reflexive understanding of the critique of ideology and does not need to lead us to abandon that project altogether.

To those who worry about the ability of critical theory to respond to a situation in which domination is more or less total and has managed to suppress any critical consciousness and practice, one can thus respond, following Geuss (1981: 83-4), that “a society of happy slaves, genuinely content with their chains”, a society in which domination is not even experienced as domination but as freedom, might be the critical theorists’ nightmare – but it “is a nightmare, not a realistic view of a state of society which is at present possible”. Nevertheless, the challenge should also not be dismissed too easily since it points to a problem or a dilemma critical theory faces: On the one hand ideology critique requires a starting point in the forms of consciousness, experience and practice of its addressees, but on the other hand ideology critique is supposed to address distortions and blockades of precisely these forms of consciousness, experience and practice. Luckily, as Scott and others insist, these distortions and blockades will in most cases turn out to be partial rather than total so that in almost all realistic scenarios

there will be oppositional forms of consciousness, experiences and practices from which critical theory can take its cue.

Furthermore, a more substantial social-theoretical account would also have to include a pluralist account of the blockades of critical reflection and practice in order to avoid the risk of conceptual overstretch that has plagued some critical theories that too easily employ the notion of ideology in order to cover all instances of non-repressive social stabilization. If it is true that ideology is one answer to the question why social relations of oppression persist and are reproduced even in the absence of overt repression (or, more correctly, with relatively moderate and highly selective forms of overt repression), it is also important to recognize that it is *only* one answer. In addition to ideology there are a whole number of other factors that can play an important role here, from selectively applied repression via coordination and cooperation problems in the face of massive power asymmetries to the ‘pathologies’ and paradoxes of collective action (see Rosen 1996).

The third addition concerns a lesson about the complexity of epistemic asymmetries that critical theory can learn from social epistemology. As the “inversion thesis” put forth by different variants of standpoint epistemology and taken up in different ways by Fricker, Haslanger and Stanley suggests, precisely those who are subjected to social oppression and thereby epistemically marginalized can turn out to be epistemically privileged with regard to identifying this oppression for what it is (see Wylie 2003). In this sense the “double consciousness” famously described by W.E.B. Du Bois – a consciousness that is at the same time oppressed *and* critical – can be interpreted as a form of “meta-lucidity” which responds to the inescapable need of those who suffer from oppression to understand how the dominant forms of consciousness function, but also in which ways they are limited (see Medina 2013).¹² Slaves, women, migrants and refugees cannot afford “white (or male etc.) ignorance” including about how power relations actually work. This lucidity can involve strategic adaptations to ascriptions of epistemic non-authority – historically relevant examples include everyday practices of resistance of slaves, proletarian subaltern public spheres and communities of “guest workers”. The corresponding “argument from practical necessity” can be complemented by an “argument from emancipatory interest” as those who are oppressed clearly have a greater interest not in maintaining the status quo but in changing it (see Collins 1989, Honneth 2016).

However, the inversion thesis should not be understood – and was never intended to be understood – as implying that subordinated agents enjoy an automatic or encompassing epistemic privilege. Standpoint is not a given but something to be achieved, both politically and epistemically. Especially under conditions in which access to epistemic resources is extremely unequal and restricted such epistemic privilege is relatively unlikely and after all many ideologies will affect both privileged and

¹² In the history of sociology Georg Simmel and Alfred Schütz seem to have something similar in mind when they equip “the stranger” with an epistemically privileged and quasi-sociological understanding of the social reality she had no choice but to learn how to navigate.

subordinated groups in negative ways. Although members of subordinated groups often have access to features of the social world that the privileged ignore – that they can afford and that they have to ignore in order to maintain a certain self-image –, it is still the case that ideology as an obstacle to social transformation is harmful specifically to the oppressed.

While critical theory can learn from this discussion that it should not categorize “ordinary” agents too quickly as passive victims of ideology or as “judgmental dopes”, it therefore continues to play an important role in responding to the practical challenges and obstacles ideologies pose. Without recourse to critical theories agents themselves will often have a hard time to identify, diagnose and explain those effects of ideology that block the development and exercise of their critical and reflexive capacities and of the social structures and social as well as psychological mechanisms that are both shaped by them and keep them in place. Under these conditions, “go ask Lisa or Larry approaches” to structural problems will not do since to explain how structures and systems work you need structural and system explanations and for these theoretical tools, including those developed by critical theory, are irreplaceable (see Haslanger 2015).

On this picture, the three challenges I started with might not completely disappear, but they become less pressing. Rather than clear alternatives they point out a spectrum the extremes of which critical theory has to avoid, or between which it has to somehow navigate. Here I can only quickly revisit them: The *normative or criterial* challenge is partly answered by the procedural turn, as critical theory, on this understanding, has no substantial normative agenda beyond the removal of the obstacles and distortions that block ordinary agents from developing and exercising their critical capacities; whatever else they do, ideologies always also operate in ways that function as such blockades and distortions, and that is at least part of what makes them problematic qua ideologies as these blockades and distortions are non-trivial both in terms of their harmful effects on subjects and in terms of their functional role in reproducing oppressive social relations. In response to the *methodological or epistemological* challenge critical theorists can point to the existence of oppositional consciousness and practices of resistance in a social reality that is more complex and conflict-ridden than the nightmarish totalizing employments of the notion of ideology suggest. And in response to the *explanatory* challenge they can insist on the importance of structural explanations that tie together different kinds of mechanisms in ways that avoid both overblown assumptions of totality and the dispersion of structure into an array of unrelated and mostly psychological mechanisms (such as implicit bias; see Haslanger 2015). It is also clear, however, that within these very broad parameters, most of the work of critical theory still remains to be done, as they say very little about the substance of social critique and the social-theoretical tools employed by it.

Let me close with a longer quote, this time from Horkheimer, which – in ways that are not limited to the specific case he refers to – encapsulates the tension with which, for these reasons, critical theory is inescapably confronted and which it should not aim at escaping:

“Even an outlook which could grasp that no opposition really exists between the proletariat’s own true interests and those of society as a whole, and would therefore derive its principles of action from the thoughts and feelings of the masses, would fall into slavish dependence on the status quo. The intellectual is satisfied to proclaim with reverent admiration the creative strength of the proletariat and finds satisfaction in adapting himself to it and in canonizing it. He fails to see that such an evasion of theoretical effort (which the passivity of his own thinking spares him) and of temporary opposition to the masses (which active theoretical effort on his part might force upon him) only makes the masses blinder and weaker than they need be. His own thinking should in fact be a critical, promotive factor in the development of the masses. [...] If, however, the theoretician and his specific object are seen as forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change, then his real function emerges. The course of the conflict [...] is to be understood as a process of interactions in which awareness comes to flower along with its liberating but also its aggressive forces which incite while also requiring discipline. The sharpness of the conflict shows in the ever present possibility of tension between the theoretician and the class which his thinking is to serve.” (Horkheimer (1937: 214-5))

References

- Adorno, T.W. (1951): Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, in: *The Culture Industry*, Routledge 1991, 132-157.
- Adorno, T.W. (1963): *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, Stanford UP 2001.
- Althusser, L. (1969): *On the Reproduction of Capitalism. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, Verso 2014.
- Bauer, R. A. & A. H. Bauer (1942): Day to Day Resistance to Slavery, in: P. Finkelman (ed.): *Rebellions, Resistance, and Runaways Within the Slave South*, Garland 1989, 84-115.
- Bauman, Z. (1992): *Intimations of Postmodernity*, Routledge.
- Celikates, R. (2006): From Critical Social Theory to a Social Theory of Critique, *Constellations* 13:1, 21-40.
- Celikates, R. (2009): *Critique as a Social Practice*, Rowman & Littlefield 2018.
- Celikates, R. (2012): Systematic Misrecognition and the Practice of Critique, in: M. Bankowsky & A. Le Goff (eds.): *Recognition Theory and Contemporary French Moral and Political Philosophy*, Manchester UP, 160-172.
- Celikates, R. (2014): Kritik der pädagogischen Vernunft: Bourdieu, Rancière und die Idee einer kritischen Sozialwissenschaft, in: J. Kastner & R. Sonderegger (eds.): *Pierre Bourdieu und Jacques Rancière: Emanzipatorische Praxis denken*, Turia & Kant, 123-146.
- Celikates, R. (2017): Beyond Needs: Recognition, Conflict and the Limits of Institutionalization, in: H. Ikäheimo, K. Lepold & T. Stahl (eds.): *Ambivalences of Recognition*, Columbia University Press (in press).
- Collins, P. H. (1989): The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, *Signs*, 14:4, 745-773.
- Dejours, C. (1998): *Souffrance en France. La banalisation de l'injustice sociale*, Seuil.
- Dotson, K. (2014): Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression, *Social Epistemology*, 28:2, 115-138.
- Finlayson, L. (2015): On Mountains and Molehills: Problems, Non-problems, and the Ideology of Ideology, *Constellations*, 22:1, 135-146.
- Fraser, N. (1987): Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation, *Hypatia. Special Issue: Philosophy and Women Symposium*, 2:1, 103-121.
- Freyenhagen, F. (2013): *Adorno's Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly*, Cambridge UP.
- Fricker, M. (2007): *Epistemic Injustice*, Oxford UP.
- Garfinkel, H. (1967): *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Polity 1984.
- Geertz, C. (1964): Ideology as a Cultural System, in: *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books 1973, 193-233.
- Geuss, R. (1981): *The Idea of a Critical Theory*, Cambridge UP.
- Hall, S. (1986): The Problem of Ideology, *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 10, 28-44.
- Haslanger, S. (2012): *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*, Oxford UP.
- Haslanger, S. (2014a): Studying While Black: Trust, Disrespect and Opportunity, *Du Bois Review* 11:1, 109-136.
- Haslanger, S. (2014b): The Normal, the Natural and the Good: Generics and Ideology, *Politica & Società*, 3:3, 365-392.
- Haslanger, S. (2015): Social Structure, Narrative and Explanation, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 45:1, 1-15.
- Haslanger, Sally (2017): *Critical Theory and Practice (The 2015 Spinoza Lectures)*, Koninklijke Van Gorcum.

- Honneth, A. (1982): Moral Consciousness and Class Domination, *Praxis International*, 2, 12-24.
- Honneth, A. (2016): Is there an Emancipatory Interest? Mark Sacks Lecture 2016.
- Horkheimer, M. (1937): Traditional and Critical Theory, in: *Critical Theory*, Seabury 1972, 188-243.
- Jaeggi, R. (2008): Re-Thinking Ideology, in: C. Zürn & B. de Bruijn (eds.): *New Waves in Political Philosophy*, Palgrave, 63-86.
- Jaeggi, Rahel/Robin Celikates (2017): *Sozialphilosophie*, Beck.
- Jost, J. T., C. M. Federico & J. L. Napier (2013): Political Ideologies and Their Social Psychological Functions, in: M. Freeden (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford UP, 232-250.
- Langton, R. (2017): *Accommodating Injustice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (in press).
- Leopold, D. (2013): Marxism and Ideology, in: M. Freeden (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford UP, 20-37.
- Marcuse, H. (1964): *One-Dimensional Man*, Beacon Press.
- Medina, J. (2013): *The Epistemology of Resistance*, Oxford UP.
- Menke, C. (2005): Virtue and Reflection: The ‘Antinomies of Moral Philosophy’, *Constellations* 12:1, 36-49.
- Mills, C. (1990): Getting out of the Cave: Tension Between Democracy and Elitism in Marx's Theory of Cognitive Liberation, *Social and Economic Studies* 39: 1, 1-50.
- Mills, C. (2017): Ideology, in: I. James Kidd, J. Medina & G. Pohlhaus, Jr. (eds.): *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, Routledge, 100-111.
- Ng, K. (2015): Ideology Critique from Hegel and Marx to Critical Theory, *Constellations*, 22:3, 393-404.
- Rancière, J. (1983): *Le philosophe et ses pauvres*, Fayard.
- Ricœur, P. (1984): *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Columbia UP.
- Rosen, M. (1996): *On Voluntary Servitude*, Polity.
- Scheman, N. (1980): Anger and the Politics of Naming, in: *Engenderings*, Routledge 1993, 22-35.
- Scott, J. C.: *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Yale UP 1990.
- Shelby, T. (2003): Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory, *Philosophical Forum*, 34:2, 153-188.
- Stanley, J. (2015): *How Propaganda Works*, Princeton UP.
- Wylie, A. (2003): Why Standpoint Matters, in: R. Figueroa & S. G. Harding (eds.): *Science and Other Cultures*, Routledge, 26-48.