

Stalnaker Semantics

Robert Stalnaker¹ revolutionized the study of conditionals by applying to it the methods of possible-worlds semantics. He regarded a conditional as true in a world w iff its consequent is true in the world most similar to w in which the antecedent is true.

Define a *candidate Stalnaker model* to be a quadruple $\langle W, I, f, @ \rangle$, where W is a nonempty set of things we're calling worlds, I is a function $\{\text{atomic formulas}\} \times W \rightarrow \{T, F\}$, f is a partial function²: $W \times \{\text{formulas}\} \rightarrow W$, and $@$, the actual world of the model, is an element of W . We define what it is for a formula to be true in a world in the model:

An atomic formula α is true in w iff $I(\alpha, w) = T$

A conjunction is true in w iff both conjuncts are true in w .

A disjunction is true in w iff one or both disjuncts are true in w .

A negation is true in w iff the negatum isn't true in w .

" $\perp$ " isn't true in w .

A conditional $(\varphi > \psi)$ is true in w iff either $\langle w, \varphi \rangle$ isn't in $\text{Dom}(f)$ or $\langle w, \varphi \rangle$ is in $\text{Dom}(f)$ and ψ is true in $f(w, \varphi)$.

A formula is true in the model iff it's true in $@$.

A *Stalnaker model* is a candidate Stalnaker model that meets these further conditions:

φ is true in $f(w, \varphi)$.

If φ is true in w , $f(w, \varphi) = w$.

If ψ is true in $f(w, \varphi)$, $\langle w, \psi \rangle$ is in $\text{Dom}(f)$.

If ψ is true in $f(w, \varphi)$ and φ is true in $f(w, \psi)$, $f(w, \varphi) = f(w, \psi)$.

A formula is a *Stalnaker theorem* iff it's derived from the following axioms by the following rules:

Axioms:

(Conditional K) $((\varphi > (\psi \rightarrow \theta)) \rightarrow ((\varphi > \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi > \theta)))$

(Reflexive law) $(\varphi > \varphi)$

(Modus ponens) $((\varphi > \psi) \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \psi$

(Centering) $((\varphi \wedge \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi > \psi))$

(Equivalent antecedents) $((\varphi > \psi) \wedge (\psi > \varphi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi > \theta) \leftrightarrow (\psi > \theta))$

(Conditional excluded middle) $((\varphi \Rightarrow \psi) \vee (\varphi \Rightarrow \sim \psi))$

¹*A Theory of Conditionals* (Blackwell, 1968).

²That is, s is a function whose domain is a subset of $W \times \{\text{sentences}\}$ and whose range is a subset of W .

Rules:

(Tautological consequence) You may write any tautology or tautological consequence of things you've written earlier.

(Conditionalization). If you've written ψ , you may write $(\phi \Rightarrow \psi)$.

A formula is a *Stalnaker consequence* of a set of sentences Γ iff it's a tautological consequence of $\{\text{Stalnaker theorems}\} \cup \Gamma$. Γ is *Stalnaker-consistent* iff $\Gamma \cup \{\text{Stalnaker theorems}\}$ is tautologically consistent. By examining the axioms and rules we verify:

Soundness Theorem. Every Stalnaker theorem is true in every Stalnaker model.

Completeness Theorem. Every formula that is true in every Stalnaker model is a Stalnaker theorem.

Sketch of proof: Suppose that χ isn't a Stalnaker theorem. Then we can form a maximal Stalnaker-consistent set $@$ of formulas that doesn't have χ as a Stalnaker consequence. $L@$ is a complete story. Form a candidate Stalnaker model $\langle W, I, f, @ \rangle$ by letting W be the set of maximal Stalnaker-consistent sets of formulas. Let $I(\alpha, w) = T$ iff $\alpha \in w$. $\langle w, \phi \rangle$ is in $\text{Dom}(f)$ iff $(\phi > _ _)$ isn't in w . If $\langle w, \phi \rangle$ is in $\text{Dom}(f)$, $f(w, \phi) = \{\psi: (\phi > \psi) \in w\}$. One can verify, although it takes a while, that, for any formula ϕ , ϕ is true in a world if and only if it's an element of the world and that $\langle W, I, f, @ \rangle$ is a Stalnaker model. $\square$

It follows that a set of formulas is Stalnaker consistent iff there is a Stalnaker model in which its members are all true. ϕ is a Stalnaker consequence of Γ iff ϕ is true in every Stalnaker model in which all the members of Γ are true. We have compactness.

There is a modal logic in the background. If ϕ is possible in w , then there is a world accessible from w in which ϕ is true, and so, on Stalnaker's assumptions, there is a closest world to w among the worlds accessible from w in which ϕ is true. So $f(w, \phi)$ is defined. Following up on this idea, we can introduce modal operators as defined symbols of the modal language thus:

$$\Diamond \phi =_{\text{Def}} \sim (\phi > _ _).$$

$$\Box \phi =_{\text{Def}} (\sim \phi > _ _ 0).$$

This gives us KT as the modal logic. The other familiar modal principles can be adopted as additional axiom.

